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Regulating Network Industries:
A Look at INTEL
Randal C. Picker†
The question “Does Regulation Promote Efficiency in Network Industries?”—the topic for the panel discussion associated
with this paper—can best be answered through an initial general
orientation on the topic, followed by a careful consideration of a
particular situation. To that end, Part I discusses ways of defining
network industries, while Part II sets out briefly the patterns of
regulation that we see in network industries. Part III turns to the
Federal Trade Commission’s recently settled case against Intel. Part
IV concludes.
To preview the conclusions, evaluating the FTC’s case against
Intel turns on tricky issues regarding the dynamics of crosslicensing. That case appears to give very little weight to the benefits
that arise from royalty-free cross-licenses. This practice reduces the
royalty rates that will be charged to personal computer makers to
the direct benefit of consumers. The settlement may very well make
it more difficult for Intel to negotiate royalty-free cross-licenses.
Indeed, from the FTC’s perspective, that is the main point. This
make it possible for prospective PC makers who might otherwise
decline to deal with Intel to do so—though this isn’t a point that
appears to have figured in the FTC’s calculus—and may foster research and development on microprocessors, which was the chief
focus of the FTC’s complaint. Still, there is little public evidence to
suggest such an outcome, and in any event, this conclusion turns
on the unexamined question of the relative importance for a licensor of cash returns versus the in-kind returns that are obtained from
cross-licenses.
† Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of
Chicago Law School and Director, Olin Program in Law and Economics. I
thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation for their generous research support, and Richard Epstein and Doug
Lichtman for comments. This paper is based on remarks made on April 10,
1999 for a panel on “Does Regulation Promote Efficiency in Network Industries?” at The Federalist Society’s 18th Annual Symposium on Law and Public
Policy: Competition, Free Markets, and the Law, held at The University of
Chicago Law School.
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As for the initial question about whether regulation promotes
efficiency in network industries, the irony here is that the settlement is generally seen as quite narrow and that Intel settled to
avoid much more stringent possibilities. That is certainly true, but
the sharpness of the scalpel has little to do with the possible pain
that it can inflict. Whether the settlement promotes efficiency
turns on very subtle assessments, none of which are accessible from
the public record in the case, if they were made at all.
I. Defining Network Industries
We should start by trying to define a network industry. For our
purposes, two settings are relevant. In the first setting—where a
network industry is defined by a physical network—a distribution
grid typically is the backbone that defines the network and that in
turn makes a network industry. Natural settings include telegraphs,
railroads, telecommunications, oil and natural gas pipelines. These
are all characterized by substantial fixed costs, natural uses and weak
alternative uses, and an essential physical connectivity.
These industries often coexist physically, since the same connected set of rights-of-way can be used over and over. Telegraphs
were strung up to parallel railroads from the very start. When Congress played amateur venture capitalist—giving cash and taking back
no equity—and appropriated $30,000 to allow Samuel Morse to test
the “practicability and utility” of the “electro-magnetic telegraph,”1
Morse turned to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to seek permission
to string his wires along its rights-of-way, which he received in exchange for giving the railroad the right to use the telegraph for
nothing.2 Congress came to understand the natural relationship
between railroads and the telegraph—one set of rights-of-way, two
uses—and the land-grant program that led to the great railroads of
the 19th Century, including the Union Pacific, called for joint development of railroads and the telegraph.3 This relationship con1 “An Act to test the practicability of establishing a system of electro-magnetic
telegraphs by the United States,” 27th Cong., Sess. III, Chapter 84, March 3,
1843.
2 See Robert L. Thompson, W IRING A C ONTINENT: THE H ISTORY OF THE
TELEGRAPH INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1832-1866 21-22 (1947).
3 See “An Act to aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line
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tinues today: Qwest Communications, a recent entrant into the
high-bandwidth communications business, built its network along
the tracks of the Union Pacific,4 while Williams Communications,
a like-minded entrant, installed fiber-optic cable next to its natural
gas pipelines.5
The second setting is the virtual network industry, which typically is organized around an ubiquitous standard. The Wintel
duopoly—Intel microprocessors coupled with the Microsoft Windows operating system—defines such a standard for PCs. The
standard specification for DVDs is another example. Sun’s recent
attempt to offer Java as a universal platform for software is yet another. Again, we often have very large fixed costs—the R&D to develop a microprocessor or an operating system—and low marginal
costs. These cost considerations will limit the number of standards
that will be at work at any one time. In addition, though much less
relevant for physical network industries, demand-side considerations—or network externalities in a phrase—will also apply pressure
to limit the number of extant standards.
Tease these out a bit. Networks come and go as technology
changes. For example, in an era in which generation of electricity
was thought to be subject to substantial economies of scale and in
which transmission losses precluded substantial distribution over a
distance, the electricity business was characterized by local natural
monopolies. These were traditional regulated industries—the
quintessential public utilities. In time, we learned that bigger was
not necessarily better for generating electricity. Very large nuclear
from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, and to Secure to the Government the Use of the same for Postal, Military, and Other Purposes,” 37th
Cong., Sess. II, Chapter 120, July 1, 1862; see also “An Act granting Lands to
aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from Lake Superior
to Puget’s Sound, on the Pacific Coast, by the Northern Route,” 38th Cong.,
Sess. I., Chapter 217, July 2,1 864 (creation of the Northern Pacific Railroad),
and, more generally, “An Act to aid in the Construction of Telegraph Lines,
and to secure to the Government the Use of the same for postal, military, and
other Purposes,” 39th Cong., Sess. I., Chapter 230, July 24, 1866.
4 See Lisa Brownlee, Going the Distance: Joseph Nacchio Isn’t Relenting in his
Qwest for U.S. West, N.Y. POST , June 27, 1999, at 56.
5 See Jennifer Walsh, Crossing Lines: Pipeline firms see the light in fiber optics,
T HE H OUSTON C HRONICLE, June 23, 1999, at 1.
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power plants had disproportionately larger downtimes than smaller
plants.6 Large plants also had very long lead times and therefore
locked generators onto a path that couldn't be responsive to
changes in market conditions. In contrast, smaller plants could be
brought on line in a much shorter time period, creating valuable
flexibility.7 It thus becomes plausible that electricity in Chicago
should be generated by multiple sources.8 That of course says
nothing about the ownership of those sources—one company could
build five 100-Megawatt plants rather than one 500-Megawatt
plant—but this clearly makes it easier to have many companies in
the generation business.
Shift from generation to transmission. Even if we want to
have many companies generating electricity, it is less obvious that we
want to have many companies transmitting electricity. Put differently, even if generation is no longer subject to natural monopoly
characteristics, transmission may be, in the sense that it may make
sense to have a single transmission grid. Again, the number of facilities says nothing about the ownership of the facilities. We could
have a single owner of the transmission grid, or we could have
shared ownership of the grid by all generators.
We can now step back and see how the electricity business has
evolved into a network industry. Before, we had a single generator
and a single owner of the transmission grid. Now, we have multiple
generators, and we are going to match those generators with a single transmission grid. Ownership of the grid itself must be addressed—and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is doing
exactly that through its independent system operator approach and
its newly-proposed regional transmission organization plan.9 But
6

See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg.
21540 (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 385) (“Order 888”).
7 For a precise method of valuing this flexibility using real options, see
A VINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK , INVESTMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY , 51-54 (1994).
8 See Steve Daniels, ComEd Rival puts Money on the Barrel: Enron Offers First
Glimpse at Pricing War; Others Expected to Follow, CRAIN ’S C HICAGO
B USINESS, July 19, 1999, at 1.
9 Regional Transmission Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 31390 (proposed June
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ownership itself merely leads to the issues of more direct concern:
generator access to the grid and its continued development.
Consider virtual network industries. In these industries, the
existence of a universal standard defines the scope of the network.
There may be multiple standards at work in such an industry, as
there were in the early days of the VCR market and as there continues to be in the PC market, but the ultimate success of one standard over another—VHS over Beta and Windows over Macintosh—means that access to the successful standard becomes important for continuing success in the industry. Consider, for example,
music distribution, which has moved from vinyl records to cassettes
and 8-tracks to CDs, and now perhaps to online distribution over
the Internet. A recording artist denied access to these media simply
would not exist. The artist could be the greatest thing since Mozart, but if she were distributing her work on modified clam shells,
it wouldn’t matter. Access to the standard means of distribution is
essential.
These standards do not arise through a single process. For example, in the beginning of the 1980s, when the original CD format was established, there were three competing approaches: a 12cm optical compact disk system from Philips and Sony (the eventual winner); a 7-cm mini-disc system from Telefunken; and the
much larger 26-cm audio high density system from JVC.10 Each of
these represented a move into the world of digital music, but there
were important differences among the systems. The Telefunken
system used the prior generation of record-pressing equipment,
thereby reducing switching costs for manufacturers. The JVC system was backwards compatible with JVC’s proprietary videodisc
machines.11 A group formed in Japan, the Digital Audio Disc
Council, provided the industry with a forum for evaluating these
competing platforms, with the hope of agreeing on a single stan10, 1999) (“FERC RTO”).
10 Digital audio disc council disbands after three years, Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(Japan Economic Journal), April 21, 1981, at 9; see also ‘Digital Audio' is Due to
Become Popular in 2 yrs, Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal),
September 16, 1980, at 8.
11 The Digital Revolution Ahead for the Audio Industry, B USINESS WEEK , March
16, 1981, at 40.
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dard. In January of 1981, before that group could act, Matsushita,
the corporate parent of JVC, announced that it would support the
Philips/Sony system and would sign appropriate cross-licenses with
Philips and Sony. This decisively tilted the tables in favor of the
now-standard 12-cm format.12
In the case of DVDs, an elaborate specification process13 has
resolved differences between competing approaches backed by
Sony-Philips, on the one hand, and Toshiba-Time Warner, on
the other. This process has also led to the formation of two patent
pools that facilitate the creation of the standards infrastructure necessary to make DVDs workable.14 In other cases—including that of
the Wintel standard—a single provider emerges as the dominant
source of the product and exercises strong control over the standard.
The dominance of Intel over microprocessors has meant that Intel
sets the standards, while its competitors, at best, attempt to replicate
what Intel has done. In operating systems that use Intel microprocessors, Microsoft has simply set the standard.
Even in the case of a dominant standard owned by a single
party, complete victory after the fact may just reflect the powerful
combination of demand- and supply-side economies of scale, which
obscures the reality that substantial competition existed at the standard-setting stage. It is easy to forget that Windows itself once
12

See “Matsushita Electric Ind. will use Philips formula,” Nihon Keizai
Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal), January 27, 1981, at 8. For an interesting
look at the chicken-and-egg problem that exists with hardware and software
complements, see Neil Gandal, Michael Kende & Rafael Rob, The Dynamics
of Technological Adoption in Hardware/Software Systems: The Case of Compact Disc Players (unpublished manuscript, February 1, 1998). And now the
fight has begun again, as it is now possible to make “warmer” CDs that should
appeal to audiophiles. Matsushita has one version, Sony-Philips another, and
so it goes. See Peter Landers, Japanese Makers are Introducing Rival Successors
to CD Player, THE W ALL ST . J., July 29, 1999, at B1.
13 Martin Levine, Single DVD Standard Reached; Market Debut Still a Question;
digital video disc, VIDEO BUSINESS, December 22, 1995, at 6. For the specifications, see <http://www.licensing.philips.com/dvdsystems/dvdspecs.html>,
and for further background, see <http://www.dvdforum.org/foruma.htm>.
14 The Department of Justice has blessed both of the DVD patent pools
through its business review process. See
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1999/2484.htm> and
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1998/2120.htm>.
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competed in a crowded marketplace for the chance to determine
the next step from the character-based, single-tasking world of
DOS. Windows started as a DOS shell—an overlay that insulated
the end-user from the cold, single-line character-based world of the
DOS C:\ prompt. Microsoft announced its new product on November 10, 1983. The original New York Times story of November
11, 1983, is quite illuminating and is worth quoting in full:
The Microsoft Corporation, a leading personal computer software company, introduced a new program to allow
computer screens to be divided into several windows, each
displaying different tasks that can be performed with the aid
of a handheld device called a mouse.
The new program will compete with Visicorp’s new
Visi-on program. Apple Computer Inc.’s Lisa computer also
allows different programs to run in different windows.
Microsoft Windows, as the product is called, will become an optional part of Microsoft’s MS-DOS operating
system, which is used on several computers.15
Lest we forget, VisiCorp was the maker of VisiCalc, the first
software killer app. VisiCorp’s annual revenues exceeded those of
Microsoft, which in 1982 were about $35 million.16 Digital Research, the producer of CP/M, the DOS of its day, already had introduced its DOS shell, or “operating environment,” as these were
sometimes called. In addition, IBM had Topview, a characterbased, multi-tasking environment. Quarterdeck was selling DesQ,
and Apple was soon selling the Macintosh. Plus, leading applications sellers—Visicorp and Lotus—were offering their visions of
the next step through comprehensive integrated products. We
know that Windows won, but standards are often set through a
substantial competitive struggle.
So, start with two basic ideas for network industries: physically
connected grids distributing the three Ps—people, product and
15

Microsoft Displays Window Program, N.Y. TIMES , November 11, 1983, at
D4.
16 See Microsoft Opens its Windows, THE ECONOMIST , November 19, 1983, at
85.
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packets—and virtually connected business ecologies organized
around a dominant standard. The physical grids are frequently described as natural monopolies, but to avoid that phrase, we might
say that it simply makes more sense to have a single integrated facility. The virtual network could also be described as a natural monopoly, pushed into existence by both supply-side costs and demand-side spillovers. For this paper, what is interesting is that the
patterns of regulation in these two industry types are completely
different, and it is to that issue that I turn next.
II. Patterns of Regulation in Network Industries
The pattern of regulation in network industries ranges from
none whatsoever to episodic intervention through antitrust litigation, and from there to comprehensive regulation in the form of
statutes such as the Telecommunications Act of 1996. These may
occur in sequence, as they did in telecommunications, where initially an antitrust action was brought against AT&T, resulting in
substantial judicial oversight under the modified final judgment.17
Only later did Congress intervene directly through the 1996 legislation. Whether we are on that path now with regard to the regulation of Microsoft is obviously an open question.
Regulation through antitrust litigation can result in the type of
narrow injunctive relief that emerged from the Department of Justice’s original action against Microsoft.18 To an outside observer at
least, the judgment had few important consequences for Microsoft,
unlike the complete restructuring of an industry that resulted from
the action against AT&T. This form of regulation is obviously in
some basic sense anti-democratic, since it is implemented by agencies, parties, and a randomly chosen judge, but is also quite tailored
to the needs of the situation. This tailoring is an important benefit
of regulation through antitrust. When we regulate through antitrust, though, we are also stuck with its most essential feature,
namely, that it is monopolization that is bad, not monopoly, cap17

United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C., 1982), aff’d sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). For discussion, see M ICHAEL K. K ELLOGG , JOHN THORNE AND
PETER W. HUBER, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS L AW Ch. 4 (1992).
18 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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tured most memorably by Judge Hand in Alcoa, where he wrote
that “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins.”19 If you are fortunate
enough to have a monopoly thrust upon you and do not take too
many steps to maintain it, but somehow magically continue to
maintain that monopoly, you are outside the purview of antitrust.
Nonetheless, we lose deadweight-loss triangles whenever we have a
monopoly, regardless of the manner in which that monopoly is
obtained, whether as manna from heaven or through cunning
worthy of the greatest robber baron bogeyman of that day.
In contrast, legislation aimed at a network industry can address
the monopoly issue quite directly. Indeed, traditional regulation of
so-called regulated industries has addressed exactly that problem.
This regulation has taken the form of controls directed at prices of
outputs—rate of return regulation coupled with price setting or
price caps—coupled with a public interest standard for building new
inputs. These regulations were designed to control the market
power associated with natural monopoly, while ensuring an appropriate return for investors.
Modern regulation builds on changes in these industries. If we
still need one electric grid but it makes sense to have many electricity producers sharing that grid, we need a new approach to regulation. We move from price regulation directed at the output market—electricity—to interconnection and unbundling rules aimed at
inputs—transmission service—with regulated prices at that input
level. A new electricity merchant producer generates electricity but
buys transmission service from the grid owner. In physical network
industries, the grid remains the one-of-a-kind facility, and access to
it is the key regulatory issue. To put the matter most simply, we
have reallocated the interconnection property right away from the
facility owner to third parties. An entrant can jump into the electricity market just by building a new power plant—and tons of
firms are doing this20—without needing to build an additional (and
redundant) transmission grid.
Access regulations shift the interconnection property from the
grid owner to the entrant. Why should this matter? After all, a
19
20

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
See FERC RTO, supra note 9, at 31393.
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potential entrant could have negotiated for access before, so if it
really made sense for the entrant to be in business, shouldn’t a deal
have been made? The grid owner could have voluntarily given access to the grid to merchant generators, just as it was forced to give
limited access to “green” electricity generators through the PURPA
legislation.21 Voluntary access was always an option, so the bastardized version of the Coase Theorem suggests that sensible deals
should have been made even when the interconnection property
right was held by the grid owner.
Should we think this is right? Probably not. It is worth noting
that the facts seem to suggest, for example, that there has been an
explosion in the independent power production business after the
adoption of Order 888.22 It is difficult to see how an independent
developer could have negotiated for access to the grid, or built a
plant to be sold to the grid owner. These are single-use assets with
only one purchaser. Plants built on spec would probably be sold for
next to nothing to the grid owner. Deals negotiated up front would
really look much more like outsourcing arrangements, where we
have a monopoly purchaser. These would only make sense if the
outsider had a comparative advantage in building plants. In any
event, the monopolist has no reason to want to create a competitor.
Under the new approaches, access to the monopoly input makes it
possible for the entrant to marry its new generating facility with
the old grid and to compete directly with the grid owner.
Creating an access regime is far from easy. The first iteration of
the key rules in the electricity industry, FERC Order 888, ran for
nearly 200 pages of dense, triple-column text in the Federal Register.23 Three years later—and with an additional 54 pages of
text—FERC has now proposed a substantial evolution of those
rules.24 We have seen a partial iteration on the telecommunications
21

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.
3117. For discussion, see Peter S. Fox-Penner, Cogeneration After PURPA:
Energy Conservation and Industry Structure, 33 J. Law & Econ. 517 (1990).
22 See FERC RTO, supra note 9, at p. 31393.
23 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access NonDiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg.
21540 (May 10, 1996).
24 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 54 Fed. Reg. 31390 (proposed
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rules with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Iowa Utilities.25
This will require the FCC to rewrite its unbundling regulations,
and also sets up the next challenge to its TELRIC pricing regulations. We also have to address ownership of the key facility. We
might tolerate a single owner if we couple that with mandatory access—this is the path we have gone down in telecommunications—or we might insist instead on joint ownership, as we are
doing in electricity through independent system operators today.26
Of course, joint ownership of bottleneck facilities was precisely the
solution offered by the Supreme Court in the great antitrust case of
United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis27 when
Jay Gould had acquired the Eads and Merchant Bridges and the
Wiggins Ferry to seize control over railroad crossing of the Mississippi River at St. Louis.
III. The INTEL Case and the Regulation
of Network Industries
The antitrust case against Intel provides a natural context in
which to discuss the appropriate scope of regulation in network industries. This case is fundamentally about access and distribution in
the context of a dominant standard. The FTC and Intel have settled the original action, but other investigations are ongoing. The
key point here is to contrast a purely antitrust focus with one that
considered Intel as part of a regulated industry.
A. FTC Action against Intel
On June 8, 1998, the Federal Trade Commission issued a
complaint against Intel.28 The FTC complaint alleged that Intel
had monopoly power over general-purpose microprocessors. Intel
was alleged to have entrenched its monopoly power by refusing to
continue to deal with certain customers as a means of coercing inJune 10, 1999).
25 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd, 119 S.Ct. 721 (U.S., 1999).
26 See generally Order 888, supra note 6.
27 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
28 The complaint and other documents in the case are available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9288/index.htm>.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

12

tellectual property licenses relating to potentially competitive microprocessor technology. Three particular instances of such abuses
were alleged relating to dealings with Digital Equipment Corporation, Intergraph Corporation, and Compaq.
On May 12, 1997, Digital had sued Intel for patent infringement, claiming that the Pentium Pro microprocessor infringed
Digital patents relating to its Alpha microprocessor. The FTC
complaint alleged that Intel responded to the Digital lawsuit by
cutting Digital off from access to relevant information relating to
Pentium microprocessors. In similar fashion, according to the FTC
complaint, Intel demanded a royalty-free license for Intergraph’s
Clipper microprocessor technology as a condition of its willingness
to continue disseminating technical information and advance chips
to Intergraph. At this time, Intergraph was a leading seller of Intel-based Windows NT workstations. Intel’s refusal to distribute
information to Intergraph was followed by a substantial decline in
Intergraph’s business.29 Finally, in November, 1994, Compaq sued
computer manufacturer Packard Bell, alleging that Packard Bell’s
systems infringed Compaq’s patented technology. The parts in
question had been supplied by Intel to Packard Bell, and therefore
Intel intervened in the lawsuit. Again, according to the FTC complaint, Intel stopped sending Compaq technical information in an
effort pressure Compaq to resolve its lawsuit against Packard Bell.
In the FTC’s view, these refusals to deal entrenched Intel’s
monopoly in general-purpose microprocessors. Intel “willfully
maintained its monopoly power in the general-purpose microprocessor market.”30 The complaint further alleged that Intel had the
requisite intent to attempt to monopolize the current generation
and future generation general-purpose microprocessor markets. As a
consequence, in the Commission’s view, Intel’s activities constituted unlawful monopolization, unlawful attempted monopolization, and unfair competition, all in violation of Section 5 of the

29

Intergraph filed a private antitrust suit against Intel alleging that Intel had
violated the Sherman Act by cutting it off from access to key information and
microprocessors, and received a preliminary injunction in its favor. Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp.2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), appeal pending.
30 Complaint, ¶ 40.
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Federal Trade Commission Act.31
On March 8, 1999, a proposed settlement was issued; on
August 3, 1999, by a 3-1 vote, the Commission approved that settlement without any changes.32 In the settlement, Intel agrees not
to withhold key information or access to microprocessor in intellectual property disputes for a period of ten years. This is limited
only in that if the customer has not agreed in writing that it will
not seek an injunction barring Intel from selling its key microprocessors, then Intel is entitled to withhold such information. Most
importantly, Intel generally maintains the right to refuse to deal
with customers or to withhold information for virtually any other
business reason. Put differently, the proposed order does not impose
a compulsory licensing scheme on Intel. In the FTC’s view, this
order facilitates competition in microprocessor technologies. Companies that might have been chilled from developing competing
technologies or from defending their existing intellectual property
rights can do so, secure perhaps in the knowledge that Intel will
not be able to cut them off for that reason.
The FTC’s published analysis of the consent order33 identified
three allegedly harmful consequences of Intel’s behavior. First, Intel
was said to receive preferential access to industry technologies
through royalty-free licenses. This put Intel in a superior position
in the microprocessor market. Note that this idea really wasn’t
made clear in the complaint. Second, the FTC argued that the royalty-free licenses that Intel received reduced the returns on the
competing patents, which in turn should reduce innovation. The
third consequence is more complex:
Finally, Intel’s conduct tends to make it more difficult
for an OEM [original equipment manufacturer] to serve as
a platform for microprocessors that compete with Intel’s.
Intel’s actions ensure that Intel can act as a conduit for
31 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
32 The settlement itself

and FTC commentary on it are available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/index.htm>. The press release announcing the
final approval of the settlement is available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9908/fyi-21.99.htm>.
33 <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelanalysis.htm>.
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technology flows from one OEM to another. … The result
is that OEMs find it more difficult to differentiate their
computer systems from their competitors through patented
technology.
It is worth noting that the FTC’s analysis assumes that more
innovation is always better, or, perhaps more precisely, that innovation should never be discouraged through exclusionary acts by monopolists. This ignores the fact that it is next to impossible to assess
whether we as a society are doing the right level of research. Two
fundamentally conflicting ideas—too much research in a tragedy of
the commons scenario and too little research due to the inability of
the inventor to grab a big enough chunk of the benefits of a new
idea—suggest the difficulty with making this assessment. The tragedy of the commons notion suggests that too many researchers are
pursuing the same ideas. No one has a property right, getting there
first produces huge gains to the winner, and lots of people rush in,
ignoring the fact that in so doing they are just re-cutting the pie,
and at best expanding it only slightly. Some researcher would find
the new idea—there is lots of nearly simultaneous discovery when
an idea is ready to emerge—and adding another researcher may
push up the date of discovery slightly, but not more than that if
many are already pursuing it. On this view, we need devices that
actually weaken the incentive to do research (or at least we need to
coordinate research). Intel would be performing a social good by reducing the incentive to do research.34
The alternative vision is driven by the empirical fact that innovators seem to capture a relatively small share of the benefits of new
ideas.35 For this purpose, what matters is that the figure is not
100%. If I have to invest $1 in something that makes society better
off by $2, I need to get at least $1 back for me to move forward. If I
34

Intel claimed that no evidence was produced to show that its behavior had
any consequence for innovation. See Intel Corporation’s Trial Brief, Public
Version (“Intel Brief”), available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/intelbrief.pdf>, at 14-19.
35 See Michael L. Katz and Janusz A. Ordover, R&D Cooperation and Competition, B ROOKINGS PAPERS ON E CONOMIC A CTIVITY, M ICROECONOMICS
137-139 (1990).
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would only get 75 cents, and the rest of society would get $1.25, I
am not going to undertake the investment. Any figure less than
100% means that the private sector will pass on some projects that
make sense for a society as a whole. This tells us that we have too
little research, and that we need to take steps to bolster research
(subsidies to universities perhaps). Intel’s behavior would just make a
bad situation worse.
And to complete the list, it is also bizarrely possible that we are
getting it just right. The fact that value seeps away from the innovator into society at large means the patent race is much less winner-take-all, and that may discourage individuals from jumping into
the race. If our IP system leaks at just the right rate—optimal seepage or leakage—we may just counteract the tragedy of the commons problems. The key point is that how we are doing is unknown and perhaps unknowable. The FTC’s case accepts, largely
blindly, the idea that more innovation is always better. To be fair,
the FTC would probably say that even if we were confident that
we needed to adjust innovation incentives, we would probably not
want to delegate that decision to Intel. Fair enough. So I will assume, as does the FTC, that more innovation is a good thing.
B. An Antitrust Look at Intel
The settlement of the FTC’s suit against Intel prevented us
from learning more about the case from the witnesses and it ultimate decision. We can do no more than speculate about how the
complex issues posed by the case would have been resolved. My purpose now is not to try to resolve these issues, but instead to just lay
clear the analytical path that an antitrust analysis would require.36
For that purpose, the heavily redacted, public pretrial briefs filed by
the FTC and Intel will suffice.37
The FTC stated its case quickly. Intel was a monopolist in the
market for general purpose microprocessors. It used its position to
maintain market dominance, and did so by creating a “privately36 For an early, careful antitrust analysis of the case, see Ronald W. Davis, The
FTC’s Intel Case: What are the Limitations on “Throwing Your Weigh Around” Using Intellectual Property Rights?, 13 ANTITRUST 47 (1999).
37 For Intel’s brief, see supra note 34. The FTC’s brief is available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/990225ccpb.pdf>.
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administered compulsory licensing regime” through which it extracted beneficial licenses of competing technology. This bolstered
Intel’s monopoly position directly, by providing access to its own
technology as well as that of its competitors, and indirectly, by discouraging competitors from developing technology, since the
benefits would just flow to Intel anyhow.
The FTC brought its claim under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, which declares unlawful
“unfair methods of competition.” That expansive language is quite
open-ended, but permits the FTC to pursue illegality under the
standards of the Sherman Act.38 This took the FTC to monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
the Supreme Court announced the test that still applies today: “The
offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”39 Under
the test of Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,40 attempted monopolization under Section 2 turns on a showing that “(1) that the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct
with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”
From there we move to a definition of monopoly
power—under Grinnell, “the power to control prices or exclude
competition”41—a definition of the relevant geographic market—the world—and a definition of the relevant product market—“general purpose microprocessors used as central processing
units (‘CPUs’) in reprogrammable digital computers.” The FTC’s
brief spends some time segmenting that market: x86 instruction set
computers (Wintel) are differentiated from non-x86 (Macintosh);
38

See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454
(1986).
39 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966). See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n. 19 (1985).
40 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
41 384 U.S. at 571.
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high-end workstations (often based on RISC chips (reduced instruction set chips) from powerful Intel CISC chips (complex instruction set chips); low-end machines where Intel’s Celeron chip
competes with chips from Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. and Cyrix
Corporation. The FTC’s brief sets out Intel’s share of revenues
from CPUs for 1993 through the first half of 1998, but these figures were redacted from the public version of the brief. The FTC
contended that these figures were buttressed by the fact that chip
production was subject to substantial barriers to entry. These barriers arose from the expense of fabrication plants—the brief cited a $2
billion 1997 figure—and the lead-time required to build these
plants; economies of scale driven by learning-by-doing; network
externality effects; intellectual property rights; and reputation. The
brief then detailed the individual cases involving Intergraph, Digital
and Compaq described above.
The FTC’s complaint then turned to characterizing Intel’s
conduct as “exclusionary,” citing the Aspen Skiing standard that
conduct is unlawful when it “exclude[s] rivals on some basis other
than efficiency.” In the FTC’s view, Intel had no legitimate reason
for declining to provide advance technical information and chip
samples. Instead, Intel was using its monopoly position to gain superior access to competing technologies and to deter innovation by
its competitors, all with the hope of preserving its CPU monopoly.
Intel responded, opening with a drumbeat based on the deposition of the FTC’s chief economics expert, Prof. F.M. Scherer:
“Dr. Scherer acknowledges that there is no evidence that [competitor’s] innovation efforts have been impaired as a result of the
conduct alleged in the Complaint.” If harm to innovation was at
the heart of the FTC’s case, Intel would try to cut that heart out by
showing that the FTC had not been able to adduce any direct evidence of harm to innovation. Intel went through competitor after
competitor—IBM, Compaq/Digital, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard,
Sun, AMD, Cyrix, and on and on—each time ending with the
statement “Dr. Scherer acknowledges ….” Intel stood ready to dispute the FTC’s conclusion that Intel had monopoly power in the
general CPU market, and emphasized repeatedly that the FTC had
offered no evidence of harm to consumers.
On the key issue of duty to deal/refusal to deal, Intel argued
that only extraordinarily narrow circumstances justify compulsory
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access of the sort characterized by the essential facilities doctrine. (It
is worth noting that the FTC had avoided the language of essential
facilities, if not the idea itself, perhaps because of the skepticism
with which the doctrine is met.42) Intel characterized successful
claims under the essential facilities doctrine as only arising in the
context of horizontal relationships. Aspen Skiing was seen as exactly
such a case, one in which joint marketing was seen as necessary.
Finally, Intel argued that it had an abundance of legitimate business
reasons for not giving advance information and chips to the three
companies. Intel held patent, copyright, and trade-secret rights in
this property which it had a strong right to control. Moreover, in
this situation, the private litigation against Intel made it more important for Intel to restrict access to its intellectual property. Additional access might give information that would otherwise be nondiscoverable and this might make it easier for the litigant to prosecute its action against Intel. In addition, the point of giving advance information and chips to customers is to make it possible for
the customer to produce new machines, but also to give important
feedback to Intel about its new chips. There was every reason to
think that that feedback would suffer given the litigation between
the companies.
Putting to one side key factual questions that are difficult to
assess without access to the information that would have come out
in a trial, from an antitrust perspective, this case turns on the
breadth of the mandatory dealing obligation, addressed most recently by the Supreme Court in Aspen Skiing, with the additional
layer of the federally-created rights of the holder of intellectual
property. It is important to recognize that this case is really quite
different from Aspen. Aspen was a we-don’t-want-you case. The
affiliated mountains thought that they were sufficient synergies
among those mountains that they did not need to strike a deal with
the excluded mountain/competitor, going so far as to omit the
name of the excluded mountain from the billboard map of the
mountains at the Denver airport. In contrast, the FTC’s claim here
is that Intel needed access to the patents of Intergraph, Digital and
42

See Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
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Compaq to maintain its dominant position in the microprocessor
market. Intel wanted to strike a deal with these companies; the
only questions were whether they would do so and at what price
and whether Intel could somehow use its position to enhance the
terms of trade. Intel is a case where both sides want access to valuable intellectual property.
The idea that this was about preservation of Intel’s monopoly
isn’t very clear here. Intergraph exited the CPU business when it
switched over to Intel chips. Nothing suggests that Intergraph is
in a position to produce competing chips today. Intergraph will get
a bunch of money if the Pentium line is found to infringe Intergraph’s Clipper patents, but it is hard to imagine that the operations
of the Pentium will be changed in any fundamental way, as we
should expect Intergraph and Intel to strike a deal. Digital’s Alpha
chip was already competing with Intel’s chips—rather unsuccessfully—when the dispute between Digital and Intel arose. The resulting lawsuits back and forth were resolved through a settlement,
which, after FTC-imposed modifications, ensured that Alpha production and development would continue.43 In both cases, if you
believed the underlying lawsuits against Intel, Intel was using ideas
patented by another company. It needed either to stop using the
ideas—possibly disrupting the Pentium edifice—or to get a license
to use the patents.
Indeed, given that there is little reason to think that competition in CPUs would increase in the short-run, the most likely immediate effect of forcing Intel to pay royalties to Intergraph or
Digital would be to raise the price of Pentium processors to customers. Intel would face a monopoly supplier of an input for its
Pentium, or PC makers would need to acquire licenses directly
from both Intel and Intergraph. If you believe the FTC’s complaint, Intel has a monopoly in general-purpose CPUs. Layering
one monopoly on a second—or placing one monopoly next to another when both inputs are required—gives rise to doublemarginalization—monopoly profits taken out at two levels—raising
43

See FTC Press Release of April 23, 1998, “FTC Ensures that Digital’s Alpha Chip—A Key Rival to Intel’s Chips—Remains Competitive,” available at
<http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9804/digitala.htm> (“FTC Alpha Press Release”).
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prices to Intel’s customers and making those customers and society
worse off. The key idea here is that Intel and Intergraph would
impose externalities on each other through their royalty decisions.44
With integration—and the royalty-free cross-license is equivalent
to integration for these purposes—these externalities vanish. Prices
of chips to PC makers should be lower with the royalty-free crosslicensing than they would be otherwise.
To see this more formally, suppose that demand for PCs is
given by p = a – bq. Assume that PC makers face an own marginal
cost of c, and royalty rates set by, say, Intel and Intergraph, of r1 and
r2 . Assume further that the PC business is competitive. Then we
can work our way back quickly to determine the royalty rates that
will be set, the price of PCs, the quantity of PCs, and overall social
welfare. Competition in the PC business imposes a zero-profits
condition:
0 = pq − c (q ) = (a − bq − r1 − r2 − c )q
(1)
This gives industry output and the market-clearing price, as a function of the royalty rates:
q* =

a − c − ( r1 + r2 )

, p * = c + r1 + r2

(2)
b
Intel and Intergraph would set royalty rates to maximize their
individual profits, respectively, r1 q* and r2 q*. The Nash equilibrium
of their simultaneous decisions—Intel is content with its royalty
given Intergraph’s and vice versa—gives royalty rates of:
a −c
a −c
r1* =
and r2* =
(3)
3
3
Plugging these back into the quantity and price formulas gives us:
a −c
2
q* =
, p * = c + (a − c )
(4)
3b
3
Now suppose that Intel has a royalty-free license from Intergraph, so that Intel can deliver both patents to PC makers. Competition in PCs again would be as before, except the single royalty
rate of r would replace r1 + r2 . Intel would maximize rq*, and this
would give a royalty-rate of:
44 Intel

makes this point as well. See Intel Brief, supra note 37, at 42 n.19.
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a −c
(5)
2
The total royalty rate has dropped by 1/6 (from 2/3 to 1/2 (a-c)), so
final market output goes up, and prices drop:
a −c
1
q* =
, p * = c + (a − c )
(6)
2b
2
Royalty-free cross-licensing means that we do a better job of
getting private costs in line with social costs. The FTC’s brief characterizes Intel’s behavior as creating a “privately-administered compulsory licensing regime.” This ignores the fact that royalty-free
cross-licensing is a common industry practice. Both parties to the
deal benefit from free access to the patent portfolio of both parties.
These are in-kind benefits from R&D that should in turn translate
into dollars when each company sells to its customers. And, as the
above analysis shows, royalty-free cross-licensing would result in
lower prices in the chip market and increased benefits to the public.45
This lets us look at the special issues posed by an IP overlay on
Aspen. Notwithstanding how we casually talk about patents or
copyrights, the immediate goal of the patent law or copyright law is
not to confer a monopoly on the rights holder. The point of I P
law is to create a scheme of meaningful property rights for a particular slice of IP. The IP rights holder should have the same right
to intangible property that I have for my tangible property. I exclude you from my watch by possessing it, but I cannot exclude you
from my IP in the same way. Hence, IP rights law creates the
power to exclude others, a power implemented through an infringement action. We could say that we have given you a monopoly over your IP, but that wouldn’t be any more meaningful than
saying that I have a monopoly over my watch.
This suggests that the generally applicable anti-competition
policy should apply equally to rights tangible and intangible. We
want individuals to write songs and build watches. If we would imr* =

45

The FTC and the Department of Justice do recognize that cross-licenses can
have pro-competitive effects. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, April 6, 1995 available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm>
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pose a mandatory dealing obligation under antitrust law relating to
tangible property, we should not pause when we switch our gaze to
intellectual property.
The royalty-free cross-licensing analysis suggests that there
would be a substantial downside to that access here. I have not tried
to model the bargaining issues that arise between IP rights holders,
but we can be sure that the analysis is quite complex. There is every
reason to think that it would be more difficult for Intel to get access to the patents of others if it lacked the power to withhold its
own intellectual property. Indeed, that is the basic premise of the
FTC’s action. We could therefore lose the substantial benefits that
we get under royalty-free cross-licensing.46
C. Intel’s Contracting Incentives
Turn from the pure antitrust look to a focus on Intel as the
center of a regulated industry-to-be. To get a handle on the critical
question of mandatory access, start by trying to understand Intel’s
private access incentives. Intel faced a number of basic choices. Intel
could have vertically integrated into computers and sold microprocessors to no one; vertically integrated into PCs but also sold chips;
or stayed out of the PC market altogether and just sold chips. If
Intel sells chips to outsiders, it must decide whether to sell to allcomers or to only a selected few. These decisions determine the
precise sense in which the Intel situation might have tracked a
more conventional regulated network industry. If Intel sells to all,
we have a universal access regime, one reached voluntarily rather
than through regulation. If Intel also integrates vertically, we have
the electricity model, where grid owners generate electricity but are
required to sell access to competing generators.
The extent to which Intel has vertically integrated has
changed over time, as Intel has gone from producing microprocessors to adding motherboards, but Intel has never gone into the PC
market. Instead, it sells components to the PC manufacturer.
46

There are more wrinkles here than the analysis so far suggests. We need to
consider what happens to innovation when ex-post cross-licensing is anticipated ex ante. For analysis, see Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development, 17 RAND J. E CON . 527 (1986) (arguing that royaltyfree cross-licensing will reduce innovation under some circumstances).
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There are any number of reasons why Intel might have pursued
this strategy. The conventional wisdom is that the open architecture scheme of the Wintel platform has decentralized decisions
about PCs, while ensuring that a basic uniform standard is met.
Apple, in contrast, has been much more vertically integrated, having a stake in the PowerPC chip while serving—for most of its
life—as the sole source of Macintosh computers. Intel gets the
benefits of having many companies producing innovation and value
to supplement its chip.
How many PC makers should/will Intel sell to? If Intel stands
ready to sell to everyone on non-discriminatory terms, we are close
to a voluntary version of the mandatory access regime, save for the
important point that Intel will set prices that reflect its monopoly
power, while the government will set prices through administrative
proceedings. If the government price would be lower than the monopoly price—which obviously would be the goal if not the result—effective access would be improved.
To begin at the most basic level, think of Intel as having three
instruments to work with: a fixed licensing fee, a per-chip royalty
rate, and the number of permitted PC manufacturers (licensees).
Intel would set each of these to maximize its profits. The general
learning of the patent licensing literature is that the patent owner
should auction a fixed number of licenses, or if an auction is unrealistic, set a fixed fee for a fixed number of licenses. If that too does
not work, the patent owner should license to anyone at a fixed royalty rate.47 But this conventional wisdom is fuzzy, and with good
reason, since this literature spends little time on the risk allocation
issues that create uncertainty and that might push in one direction
or another. The other point to note is that the patent case is not
perfectly analogous here. Intel spends billions a year on R&D48 and
then spends billions more to build the fabrication plants for the
chips.49 So even after R&D, Intel incurs a substantial marginal cost
to produce each chip it sells. An auction at a fixed amount or a flat47

See M ORTON I. KAMIEN , Patent Licensing, in 1 H ANDBOOK OF G AME
THEORY WITH E CONOMIC APPLICATIONS (eds. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu
Hart) (1992).
48 FTC Brief, supra note 37, at 15 (citing the Intel 1997 Annual Report).
49 Id. (quoting Albert Yu, an Intel senior vice president).
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fee purchase for access would not send PC makers the right price
signals, as the PC makers would ignore Intel’s marginal costs in
producing a chip. We should think that Intel should engage in
two-part pricing, with a royalty rate set at Intel’s marginal cost, and
with the fixed-licensing fee set to extract profits fully from the PC
makers.
If, as probably tracks the facts, Intel looks principally to royalty
rates—per-chip prices—to make its money, then Intel should be
willing to license anyone at the profit-maximizing royalty rate. A
quick look at the relevant equations from the standard Cournot
model will make this clear. Suppose that demand for PCs is given
by p = a – bQ. Assume that production costs are given by z + cq,
where z is the fixed cost of producing PCs and c is the marginal
cost of production. Profits for a given PC maker are given by (p – c
- r)q – z – F, where r is Intel’s royalty rate, and F is Intel’s fixed licensing fee. Maximizing profits in a Cournot equilibrium means
that each producer chooses its q for given rest-of-the-industry output. With a little work,50 we can establish that industry output Q is
given by:
N (a − c − r )
(7)
Q=
b ( N + 1)
This is total industry output under Cournot competition with
N licenses and a royalty rate of r.
With marginal costs of cp , profits for Intel are given by

(

)

Π p = r − c p Q + NF
or, in equilibrium,

(8)

50 Differentiate

with respect to individual firm quantity, the profit function for
each of the N producers to get:

∂Π i
= (a − bQ − c − r ) + q i ( −b ) .
∂q i

We have N of these equations, where N is the number of Intel licensees. To
solve this, set the N first order conditions to zero and sum across the N firms
to get:

N (a − bQ − c − r ) = bQ
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(

Πp = r − cp

N a −c −r
) b((N + 1) ) + N F

(9)

Intel sets r, F and N.
If we constrain F to be 0—the idea being that other reasons,
probably uncertainty, push towards revenues through chip
prices—Intel chooses r and N. Differentiating Intel’s profits with
respect to r and solving the first-order maximization condition for r
gives
a − c − cp
r* =
(10)
2
Plug this into the formula for Intel’s profits, and we get:
Πp =

(

N a − c − cp

)

2

(11)
4b ( N + 1)
This is rising in N, so under these assumptions, Intel wants as
many PC makers as possible. A zero-profits condition in the PC
market will determined ultimate entry.
This crude starting point gives some sense of how we should
expect Intel to behave. Intel would offer licenses to everyone, but
would set a monopoly price. If the government had the will and
the information, it might do better by lowering the price to that
which would maximize overall welfare. This is no more a universal
access regime than the one that Intel would set up privately, only
the price is different, so effective access is higher. In any event, we
know that this analysis ignores many issues that we should expect
to be relevant. Our PC makers are identical, boring zeros, making
only the Cournot quantity decision. Intel doesn’t care at all about
the identity of the PC makers, it just wants as many licensees as
possible. We have not yet given any reason that Intel should prefer
one licensee to another, or why it should have any interest in cutting off a licensee.
For better or worse, we know that that runs contrary to the
facts. Like many manufacturers of complex products, Intel segments its customers into many categories.51 Intel customers who
qualify as Intel Product Dealers receive training, rebates and techni51 See

<http://channel.intel.com/business/programs/uscanada.htm>.
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cal information from Intel.52 This category applies to systems integrators building fewer than 20,000 PCs per quarter. Customers can
take the additional step of seeking to become an Intel Authorized
Solution Provider.53 These customers must already be in a program
such as the product dealers program, and they must also satisfy Intel
certification tests and other requirements. More steps mean more
benefits, including early information and controlled use of the Intel
logo. These programs are separate from the highly secretive deals
struck by Intel with original equipment manufacturers. The FTC
has an ongoing investigation into this program, including the very
visible “Intel Inside” advertising program.54 Of course, Intel could
be acting just in its private interests through this program, but there
is every reason to think that broader interests are at stake as well.
The formula for Intel’s profits in equilibrium gives us some
sense of why Intel—and society as well—should care about Intel’s
customers. Intel’s profits are bigger if c is smaller. Imagine a setting
in which the marginal cost of production of the PC maker is not
known, to either the company or Intel, before production starts.
Operations give information. Intel will want to swap high-cost
producers for low ones and could push exit through its termination
policy. The marginal cost of production is just a proxy for any value
that might be added by the PC manufacturer. This would include
innovations by a PC maker that would make the computer more
attractive for consumers. To return to the antitrust argument for a
moment, whatever the merits of the FTC’s position on competition in microprocessors, it is hard to see without a much more
complex story why Intel would want to thwart innovations in
products complementary to its CPUs. This was a key claim regarding Intel’s behavior as to Compaq. As should be clear intuitively,
Intel cares about the quality of its licensees; this shows up in equation (11) through the marginal cost c, but applies more generally as
well.

52 See <http://channel.intel.com/business/america/ipd/progsumm.htm>.
53 See <http://channel.intel.com/business/authorization/who/index.htm>.
54 See Lisa Dicarlo, Inside Intel: Chip maker’s restrictive marketing

program—and millions in subsidies—shackle PC makers, PC WEEK , April 5, 1999,
at 1.
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D. Strategic Licensing
We still have not approached anything like the facts as seen by
the FTC. Intel did not allegedly cut off or threaten to cut off Intergraph, Digital or Compaq because they were bad at what they
did. So turn instead to two possible strategic and anti-competitive
uses of licensing. First, Intel might license potential competitors in
order to reduce incentives to develop competing microprocessors.
Suppose that Intel refused to license those who might be best situated to compete with it and just vertically integrated into computer
production, or, more realistically, licensed its microprocessors only
to those firms who were unlikely to enter the microprocessor market. Firms left outside the PC market would need to enter the microprocessor market first to get into the PC market. Entry of this
sort might ultimately put at risk Intel’s market position in microprocessors. In this scenario, Intel chooses to keep its enemies close
at hand by licensing those firms that would be its strongest competitors, giving them a chunk of the returns in the PC market, and
thereby reducing their incentive to develop independently competing microprocessors.55 So Intel would license to strong potential
competitors and would refuse to license weak potential competitors,
all in an effort to perpetuate its market position in microprocessors.
How would we tell whether that happened here? Intergraph
initially built its workstations using the Clipper chip, a RISC chip
sold by the advanced processor division of Fairchild Semiconductor.56 In 1987, Intergraph vertically integrated by purchasing the
division and the chip. Five years later, in 1992, Intergraph decided
to consider switching to Intel processors. The next year, it made
the change, and dropped further development of the Clipper chip.
According to Intergraph’s complaint, in July 1996, Intel started discussing the patents covering the Clipper. Intergraph’s lawsuit resulted in a preliminary injunction against Intel. That litigation is
still pending, with the judge having ruled most recently that Intel
55 See

Nancy T. Gallini, Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for
Licensing, 74 AMER. ECON. REV. 931 (1984) for development of this idea.
56 These facts are taken from the Intergraph’s Amended Complaint, originally
filed November 17, 1997 available at
<http://www.intergraph.com/intel/complnt.htm> (“Intergraph Amended
Complaint”).
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does not have a license for the Clipper patents,57 and a jury trial on
the patent infringement issue is scheduled for February, 2000.58
This is not what the FTC’s complaint addressed. Instead, the
second strategic use of licenses and information is threatened withdrawal after the customer has become dependent on access to Intel
technology. The customer invests heavily in Intel chips; in the
words of the Intergraph complaint:
As a result of the assurances of Intel, and the transition
to Intel-based workstations, Intergraph is now technologically and economically “locked in” to the use of Intel’s
CPUs. Intergraph has designed its products and systems
based on Intel’s CPUs and, because there are no high performance alternatives, Intergraph cannot economically or
feasibly switch to other CPUs.59
With the customer completely dependent on Intel
technology, Intel has the upper hand and can expropriate
value from its customer through the threat of withdrawal.
Intel therefore could demand, and did, a royalty-free license
to the Clipper technology.
This story only works so well. Intergraph’s lock-in must have
been anticipated by both sides. This is a simple case of specific investments with the threat of after-the-fact hold-up. There is
nothing particularly interesting there; indeed, the more interesting
side is the set of institutional responses, such as second-sourcing,
which are designed to make the hold-up more difficult.60 Hold-up
57 See

Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., Memorandum of Opinion (CV 97-N3023-NE, N.D. Ala. June 4, 1999) available at
< http://www.intergraph.com/intel/integra.htm> (“June 4th Order”).
58 See Lisa DiCarlo, Judge finds for Intergraph in patent spat; Intel vs Intergraph;
Company Business and Marketing, PC WEEK , June 7, 1999 at 6.
59 Integraph Amended Complaint, supra note 56, ¶ 13.
60 See Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, Second-Sourcing as a Commitment
Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition, 103 Q. J. ECON. 673 (1988); Michael
H. Riordan & David E.M. Sappington, Second Sourcing, 20 RAND J. E CON .,
No.1, Spring 1989. Indeed, second-sourcing had been a key element of Intel’s
early success. See Tim Jackson, INSIDE INTEL: ANDY G ROVE AND THE RISE
OF THE WORLD ’S M OST P OWERFUL C HIP C OMPANY , ch. 10 (1997).
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could have taken the form of demanding higher payments for chips
down the road, or separate fixed-fee cash payments, or virtually
anything else.
Hold-up after specific investment is completely generic. It is a
risk that would be faced by any Intel licensee—not just those with
possibly competing IP rights. The threat of expropriation is determined by the size of the investment and the cost of switching to
competing technology. If Intel asks for value and gets it, the form
in which tribute is paid may depend on whether the target has
valuable IP rights, but as a first cut, the amount itself should be independent of those rights.
We therefore need to say something more refined for the
FTC’s story to work. Compare, for example, a royalty-free license
sought before dependence on Intel’s technology with one sought
afterwards. When it first dealt with Intergraph, Intel could have
sought a royalty-free license for any patented Clipper technology
arguably infringed by the Pentium line.61 Licensing of this sort is
the order of the day in the high-tech business. Recall that the FTC
action focused on patents of Intergraph, Digital and Compaq.
Digital’s original suit against Intel—and the resulting countersuit
by Intel—resulted in a complex settlement, one piece of which was
cross-licensing of the relevant patents.62 Intel intervened in Compaq’s suit against Packard Bell, but that suit was ultimately settled
with undisclosed payment terms but with a license running in favor
of Packard Bell.63 Indeed, Compaq eventually stood ready to license
its patent portfolio to other PC manufacturers, including Gateway,
and entered into a cross-licensing program with Intel itself.64
So suppose that Intergraph and Intel had discussed licenses
61 Indeed, Intel believed that it had such a license, a position ultimately rejected
by the district court. See June 4th Order, supra note 57.
62 See FTC Alpha Press Release, supra note 43.
63 See “Compaq & Packard Bell Settle Patent Litigation,” Edge: Work-Group
Computing Report, June 24, 1996; see also Intel press release of January 18,
1996, “Compaq and Intel Corporation Announce New Agreements in Engineering and Marketing” (available at
<http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/releases/cpqii.htm>).
64 Lisa DiCarlo, Compaq Licenses Patents to Gateway; PC Giant Expects to Forge
Deals with other Manufacturers; Gateway 2000 Inc.,” PC WEEK , December 26,
1994, at 100.
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before Intergraph tied itself to the Pentium line. Assume that the
Pentium chips actually infringed the Clipper technology. What
matters for the negotiation is what the parties know about this.
Think through four rough combinations on the infringement information: both know the chips infringe; neither knows; Intel does
and Intergraph doesn’t; and vice versa. If both know, nothing interesting happens; the price associated with the infringement action is just that, and will either be paid by Intel to Intergraph or
netted out if they do a deal. If neither knows whether the Pentium
line infringes the Clipper patent, whatever terms the parties strike
represent a bet over their ignorance.
If Intel is worried about potential infringement claims, Intel
might use the offer of a royalty-free license from the customer as a
way of smoking out lurking infringement claims.65 Customers
without competing technology could grant the license easily, while
possible competitors, such as Intergraph, would be giving up
something of value. Intel would effectively be charging different
prices to different customers as a function of the value of their
technology, a form of price discrimination. You would expect
knowing potential customers to separate out, with those with the
best technology refusing to become Intel customers and being
forced to compete with Intel. That makes clear the risk to Intel of
this approach. Much like the story described above, Intel might very
well prefer to have its strongest competitors dump their technology
and switch to Intel. The upfront royalty-free license has just the
opposite effect with potential customers who have valuable patents
and knowledge.
In the fourth case—Intel knows and Intergraph doesn’t—if
Intel usually seeks royalty-free licenses from customers, Intergraph
learns nothing from the request. Obviously, an Intergraph-specific
request should convey information to Intergraph about what Intel
knows. Indeed, the facts suggest that Intel added the royalty-free
license to a particular non-disclosure agreement it presented to Intergraph, after Intel faced indemnification claims from Intel customers who in turn faced patent infringement claims from Inter65

This is a genuine possibility, as the patent appears to allow patent holders to
wait to assert their claims for as much as six years. See Wanlass v. General
Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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graph.66
Thus, the possibility of upfront licensing turns on the state of
the parties’ knowledge. Intel should find it difficult to get an upfront license from a company that knows that it has valuable patent
rights. Intel might choose not to pursue such a license if it thought
that that would merely push away companies that would then be
forced to compete with it. Intel might turn instead to after-thefact licenses of the sort alleged in the FTC complaint.
There is no general claim that Intel tries to rip off all of its
customers. That fact might be explained through a standard repeat
play/reputation story, or, if worse came to worst, common sense.
The more interesting question is to ask why Intel grabs only from
those customers with competing technologies, and why this might
be perceived as legitimate by Intel’s customers as a group. This takes
us back to the double monopolization problem described before.
Absent the royalty-free license, we will have two licensors for the
relevant technology, in this case, Intel and Intergraph. In this scenario, both technologies would be required to use the Pentium
chip. As we saw before, separate royalty rate-setting by Intel and
Intergraph would result in higher royalty rates than would be set by
a single owner of both patents. This will make Intel’s customers as
a group worse off. Intel’s threat, if successful, restores single ownership of the patents at stake.
In this framework, potential customers who know that they
have valuable patents will decline to deal with Intel. They will fear
the after-the-fact grab alleged in this case. Potential customers who
don’t know that they have valuable patents will go ahead and deal
with Intel, and then face the after-the-fact grab. This will make
their patent rights less valuable and should discourage innovation at
the margin. If the law forbids after-the-fact grabs from customers
with competing patents, customers with knowledge who would
not otherwise deal with Intel will do so, and customers without
knowledge will deal with Intel and receive a greater return on their
patents.
E. Access and Pricing Regimes
Put differently, the standard approach of network industry
66 See

Intergraph Corp., supra note 57, at 1266-67.
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regulation—non-discriminatory, open access—makes it possible for
knowing potential customers to do business with Intel when they
would otherwise decline and should increase returns to the ignorant
with patents who would blithely contract with Intel and risk afterthe-fact plunder. This all comes on top of whatever benefits, if any,
are achieved by substituting government price-setting for access for
Intel’s monopoly price-setting of access.
It also would come at the price of substantial government
oversight of an unbelievably dynamic industry. We can slice and
dice the access and pricing rules to get a better sense of the possibilities:
1. None. No regulation at all. This is the world prior to
the FTC’s action.
2. Context-Specific Negative Duties. Intel cannot bar for
specified reasons access that it would otherwise grant absent those reasons. This is what comes out of the settlement itself, as Intel cannot use an IP dispute as a basis for
refusing to deal with a customer.
3. Mandatory Access with Private Prices. Intel can adopt
whatever price schedule it wants, but must deal with everyone at these prices.
4. Mandatory Access with Regulated Prices. This is the
contemporary scheme of mandating access to inputs and
regulating the price of those inputs.67
Take these in reverse order. The fourth possibility is now familiar to us. It has the virtue of controlling the exercise of monopoly power, but comes at the cost of forcing the government to
make repeated, difficult calculations of appropriate prices. This
would be especially challenging for the government given the speed
of change in the CPU industry. The third possibility is rarely used,
if ever, but has the benefit of eliminating the asymmetric information and bargaining issues described above. It means accepting monopoly pricing. It also risks disturbing the voluntary process of negotiated, royalty-free cross-licenses. We need to know much more
67

I will ignore a fifth possibility, namely, that the FTC could regulate prices
and leave the access decision to Intel.
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about those dynamics before we can confidently say that we improve matters by taking away from Intel the right to withhold its
IP rights as part of an effort to get IP rights from others.
The second possibility could be imposed either through antitrust litigation as occurred here or through legislation. These preserves some dealing and pricing flexibility for the target of the
regulation, but also solves, at least in theory, the asymmetric information problem. I say in theory, because as Commissioner Swindle
noted in his comments on the settlement,68 negative duties are very
difficult to enforce. Intel could deny access for a pretextual business
reason, when in reality it was driven by IP motives. If you were to
believe that such a negative duty was essentially unadministrable,
this would drive you towards scheme 1 or 3. The second approach,
like the third approach, may make it for Intel to strike sociallybeneficial royalty-free cross-licenses. Finally, the first possibility—no regulation at all—speaks for itself.
IV. Conclusion
As noted before, the FTC’s case against Intel turns on tricky
issues regarding the dynamics of cross-licensing. These are essentially barter transactions, and we have only a weak understanding of
when firms will turn to barter. Interfering with cross-licensing will
make it more difficult for these transactions to take place, and to
understand the importance of that, we need to have a better handle
on the relative importance for a licensor of cash returns versus the
in-kind returns that are obtained from cross-licenses.
We can say with more confidence that the FTC’s case appears
to give very little weight to the benefits that arise from royalty-free
cross-licenses. These licenses eliminate the double monopoly problem that can arise when two patent holders hold essential patents.
Royalty-free cross-licensing eliminates through a contract an externality between the patent holders that would otherwise push up
prices, to the detriment of the patent holders and their customers.
The settlement may very well make it more difficult for Intel to
negotiate royalty-free cross-licenses and may harm society in doing
so.
68 Available

at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/swindle.htm>.
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But, from the FTC’s perspective, that is the main point of the
settlement. This should have the benefit of making it possible for
prospective PC makers who might not deal with Intel to do
so—though this point does not appear to have figured in the FTC’s
calculus. These prospective PC makers will have less reason to fear
that Intel will later pressure them into a cross-license. This will increase the pool of PC makers, though the benefits of this are quite
speculative. Equally speculative is whether the settlement will foster
R&D on microprocessors—the chief focus of the FTC’s complaint—though there is little public evidence to suggest that outcome.
As to the question of whether regulation promotes efficiency
in network industries, the irony here is that the settlement is generally seen as quite narrow and that Intel settled to avoid much more
draconian outcomes. That is certainly true, but that is not to say
that small steps necessarily do little harm. What matters is precisely
how close you are to the cliff when you start taking steps, small or
large. On that score, whether the settlement promotes efficiency
turns on quite subtle assessments, none of which are accessible from
the public record in the case, assuming that they were made at all.
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